INTRODUCTION
Radio was almost always on. When not broken due to constant use and technological imperfection, he had something for everyone. Maxl opted for sports, while his sister gravitated towards sweepstakes that let her dream of an acting career and its main staple: a vast wardrobe. The issue was, however, that the siblings did not get to enjoy their favorite shows as often as they wished. Listening tastes, the letter provocatively suggested, expressed deep generational divides. They cast doubt on the idealized image of cozy togetherness and radio's ability to make "family life bearable again," as playwright Bertolt Brecht had once put it. 5 Father frowned upon entertainment, which, he maintained, interfered with the children's homework. To his children's dismay, he professed loyalty to long lectures about "Göte and Schiller." "When something like that is on," Maxl lamented, "one may not speak and must only listen because it is culture." The trouble with culture, in his mind, was that then everyone looks so sad, and it's not at all fun, and I must yawn because it is so long and I may not show my boredom. … When it is over, everyone says how beautiful it was. Even I, because I don't dare disagree and must become educated, and also because my father spanks me if I object. My sister Anni also objects but puts on a sanctimonious face whenever there is a symphony or our student lodger is around. I think she'd much rather hear jazz (Tschäs) … Mother likes something quiet and moving from her youth, like opera. That I can't stand because they always gargle with sounds and I have no idea what they want. Father likes politics and says that he wants to listen to everything to make up his mind, because he is a citizen and must vote for Adenauer.
There were, of course, also programs for schoolchildren, but Maxl had yet to hear one: they came on only while he was at school. "When I grow up," he pledged, "I will once tune to the school broadcast-I must find out what it does!" As other such absurdities grew into a satirical crescendo, the hobbling syntax of Maxl's deliberately awkward one-sentence summary emphasized their extensive roster. A jarring non sequitur ("This is how an entire people is deeply stirred by radio, and it is a cultural institution"), his finale made clear that quite the opposite was the case.
Without doubt, Maxl's sentiment echoed that of many earlier skeptics. 6 "A phenomenon of the century," Brecht observed in 1927, "but to what end?" 7 Yet while the dramatist bemoaned mostly radio's suffocation in the hands of the bourgeoisie, Maxl had a bone to pick with every thinkable postwar authority in control, be it parental, media-professional, or stateadministrative. His unmistakably time-specific grievances, delineate much of this special issue's scope.
Academic Contexts
The central themes of the boy's complaints cast West German radio as an important object of interdisciplinary inquiry. While the subsequent section deals with the medium's sociocultural environments, here I outline the related academic contexts: North American, German, and continental. They are notable for the vast asymmetries in their approaches to and the extent of interest in the subject at hand.
Thus far, radio has been a topic largely overlooked by North American Germanists focused on the decades beyond Weimar and National Socialism. 8 Outside the context of postwar radio plays or West and East Berlin stations such as Rundfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor (RIAS) or DeutschlandTreffen der Jugend 1964 (DT64), 9 German radio has made infrequent appearances in publications west of the Atlantic. 10 In Anglophone surveys of German history and culture, chapters on the medium as the society's integral constituent have been anything but the norm. 11 This observation also applies to two seminal anthologies dedicated exclusively to sound, where radio has merited scant attention-much less than film or music. 12 The same could be said about Germany's presence in North American communications and media studies, where emphases on Anglophone stations or domestic perspectives on broadcasting, be it national or international, prevail. 13 Conversely, German radio experts, with a few exceptions, have yet to engage in consistent dialogue with their colleagues stateside.
14 Wolfgang Hagen's study of German and American broadcasting-the only systematic account of this kind-portrays two discrete sonic worlds and lacks an overlapping chronology, with the German chapter ending in 1945 and the American extending into the late twentieth century. 15 These two worlds, one could easily argue, ought to be compared precisely following 1945, when international debates about Americanization, commercialism, and the status of culture on the air flared up anew. 16 Moreover, at that point the advent of television generated another significant distinction worthy of being investigated. Vis-à-vis the U.S., where TV broadcasts became routine in 1948 and gained momentum in 1952, Germany, similar to many other European countries, was a latecomer. Although regular television programming in both East and West began in 1952, for the remainder of the decade sound prevailed, cementing radio's position for years to come. In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the registered listener numbers doubled between 1950 and 1960, whereas in the U.S. they plummeted. 17 So, what did it mean that the golden age of American television overlapped with German radio's golden age? Is it significant that Maxl's criticism of radio broadcasts as barely audible, uninspired, and poorly scheduled was, across the Atlantic, long reserved for television? Rather than simply providing a socioeconomic explanation for this asynchronicity, we need to ask about its impact on programming, technologies, and radio's social functions well into the present.
This brings up the third context: Europe, where explorations of audiovisual media have been widely comparative. 18 Whereas histories of television have recently adopted the transatlantic angle, 19 interrogations of radio have been more insular: zooming in on the continent and the British Isles, they have typically said little about the U.S. 20 While this collection can only do a small part in redressing the long list of the above asymmetries, its main purpose is to make a range of approaches to German radio accessible for an English-speaking audience and facilitate a conversation among the academic constituencies named above.
To this end, the articles in this issue pursue three main goals. First, they expand radio's German topographies beyond Berlin, already criticized as an overly privileged (Cold War) site. 21 Second, they map the medium's connections to culture far beyond its "symbiotic" relationship with postwar literature and its central motifs-homecoming, victimhood, or reconstruction. 22 Such broadened spatial and temporal horizons, on the one hand, invite a consideration of a professionally diverse group of German (public) intellectuals that includes but is not limited to writers. On the other hand, they make room for tracing a long-term trajectory of the key postwar genre-the radio play-well into the Cold War. Doing so not only provides a sense of the genre's development but also helps us gauge radio's importance in constituting, recording, and confronting the era's central emotion: fear. Third, by articulating aspects of West German radio in the American academic context, the contributions continue to trouble the narrow perspective of the national broadcast narratives, the dominant monolingual paradigm of existing transnational telecommunications research in the U.S., as well as the heavily Eurocentric focus of the extensively developed continental explorations of broadcasting. They seek to pick up where Hagen's study left off and, as I explain further below, bring together European and American scholars to locate Germany on the map of transatlantic media studies.
Implicit in Maxl's letter, the issue's themes are instrumental in this task. They touch on radio's role in shaping the meaning of culture, transmitting pedagogy and affect, forging a relationship with civic engagement and democracy, enforcing generational differences and listening tastes, as well as imagining territorial sovereignty and postwar losses. Although the confines of this collection relate such topics to Germany as the unique "border region of the Cold War," 23 the concerns are not exclusive to either the location or the period. If used comparatively, as I hope they would be, the above themes can shed light on the divergent contents, objectives, meanings, and uses of audiovisual media in distinct cultures and at varied historical moments. The disjunctures between them are especially significant because they encourage us to question the uniform patterns of development and influence frequently attributed to the circulation of non-print media across borders. Radio, in other words, meant different things in different cultural environments, even if these were contemporaneous.
In the West German context, these points of emphasis stemmed not solely from the broadcasting officials or eminent intellectuals, but, as Maxl's letter shows, from the audiences as well. Against the cliché of the "inscrutable" public, 24 Der Runkfunkhörer's appeals claimed the microphone for the listeners and showcased the "notable dedication" of the latter to the medium's cause. 25 Bypassing the smoke-filled rooms of audience research departments, attached to virtually every sizeable station by the mid 1950s, Gebhard's Bavarian Association of Radio Listeners and TV Viewers (Verband der Rundfunkhörer und Fernsehteilnehmer in Bayern) and its counterparts elsewhere in Germany, including the Association of Radio Listeners in Saarland (Saarländischer Verband der Rundfunkhörer) and the Berlin Union of Radio Listeners and TV Viewers (Verband der Berliner Rundfunkund Fernsehteilnehmer e. V.), staked out the position of the era's "audiovisual coevals" (Mitlebenden). These were historical subjects reliant on more than text alone, invested in versatile means of communications, and therefore arguably more involved. 26 As Rundfunkteilnehmer, or, literally, "broadcast participants," they claimed their part of Germany's technologically, ideologically, politically, geographically, and culturally re-carved mediascape, to which I now turn.
Why (West) Germany?
The designation Rundfunkteilnehmer captured not only the financial scaffolding of European public broadcasting, based on license fee payments in exchange for access to programs. In contrast to the much more straightforward English "listener," the German term's morphology-especially Teil, or part-raised the question of the waves' ownership. Precisely the latter was the pivot at which the themes of Maxl's letter converged. Who ought to claim the ownership, literal as well as figurative, of the public audiovisual media-then the only existing kind, since private commercial broadcasting would be legalized only in the 1980s? Around 1954, the choice was not only between the listeners and the bourgeois-capitalist corporations, as it had once been for Brecht in the late 1920s or, implicitly, for Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno in the late 1940s, when they lamented the disfigurement of the consumers' original needs in the hands of the business-driven "culture monopolies." 27 Circa 1949, when two separate German states were established, multiple international actors came into play on their territory. They intervened in this very distinctive "subregion of the global mediascape … where media users could, thanks to the shared language, switch between East and West more easily than anywhere else in Europe." 28 This fundamental characteristic set German broadcasting apart from that of any other country on the continent.
The above actors were less numerous in the eastern-bloc German Democratic Republic (GDR), characterized by the state-enforced goal to chase Brecht's dream and attempt, with only partial success, to extract radio's bourgeois roots by investing in a new generation of specialists. 29 To the west of the Iron Curtain, in the FRG, however, tensions between the discrete parties were more pronounced. There, stipulating the frameworks of control over the public mass media became a keystone of the fledgling German democracy, where reeducation agendas depended on consistent and speedy dissemination. 30 On the surface, the solution seemed simple. Under Allied supervision, by the late 1940s Hitler's centralized propaganda machine, including radio and early television, was dismantled and responsibilities disaggregated among the individual states, or Länder. 31 This meant that six main broadcasting stations opened by 1949, in addition to the U.S.-founded RIAS and, following 1954, Sender Freies Berlin-the seventh station. The American zone was home to the Bayerischer Rundfunk (BR, Munich), Hessischer Rundfunk (HR, Frankfurt/Main), Süddeutscher Rundfunk (SDR, Stuttgart), as well as Radio Bremen (RB). The French zone was served by Südwestfunk (SWF) from Baden-Baden and the British by the Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk (NWDR) from Hamburg, Cologne, and Hanover. 32 As durable as the federal model appears-the present-day landscape of German public broadcasting has grown around the core of these seven stations-it was difficult to institute.
The hurdles were many. For years, British, French, and American powers-that-be were unable to overcome zonal differences and agree on a vision of the country's (tele)communications independent from their respective national interests. 33 Then, West Germany's first postwar chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) attempted to wrest authority over radio and television from the Länder and hand it over to his Bonn government-the con-stant sound of his voice likely being responsible for Maxl's father's voting "decisions." 34 To complicate matters further, West Germany did not have full control of its airwaves (Rundfunkhoheit) until 1955, was not a re-admitted into the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the world's key broadcasting regulatory board, until 1953, and was bound to host numerous U.S.-funded radio stations, official and clandestine alike, following a bilateral agreement signed in 1952. Besides, the country had to wage a tiresome battle for frequencies. When, in 1948, the Copenhagen Plan allocated about 120 medium-wave frequencies to some 600 European stations, occupied Germany, as Alexander Badenoch investigates, received only a few. 35 To make things worse, "the foreign peoples" speaking via the Voice of America, American Forces Network, or Radio Free Europe, not bound by the plan, often claimed these precious slots and caused considerable interference with the native stations. In some areas, as North Rhine-Westphalia's Prime Minister Karl Arnold observed in 1954, "medium-wave broadcast was crowded to the point that things really bump[ed] against one another." 36 Such encroachments, West Germans maintained, drowned the national radio and stood in the way of television as well. 37 Yet, the outcomes of these transgressions were not only negative. As Badenoch observes, they propelled West Germans in their search for creative technical solutions, leading them to embrace FM radio nearly a decade before it fully caught on in the U.S. 38 Moreover, hundreds of German engineers and radio technicians manned the transmissions and control consoles at the U.S.-run stations, and special private police forces were recruited among the natives to take care of security. Besides, the above transgressions undermined the myth of discrete national voices: in the new conflict, the waves' ability to trespass boundaries-by now "a mental commonplace"-became radio's foremost asset. 39 The convergence of the above problems in just one country-the FRGforegrounds this special issue's focus on the divided nation's western half. To an even greater extent than the GDR, the Federal Republic became a location central, in geographical, strategic, and logistical terms, for waging the Cold War on the air. It was a laboratory for testing radio's "promiscuous" spatiality, not easily contained within state boundaries. 40 Indeed, West Germany's national territory existed in constant tension with its much larger "acoustic territory," spilling over both east-and westward. 41 On its soil, radio, widely recognized as the era's most powerful and far-reaching psychological warfare weapon, turned into a crucible of "the transatlantic century." 42 That is, it became a litmus test not only for the East-West fault lines but also for the West's internal inconsistencies and frictions. Across the blocs as much as within the western alliance, radio captured mutual "admi-ration and abhorrence, vehement opposition on the one hand and blatant appropriation on the other." 43 It registered the fact that transatlantic influences, "selectively resisted, adapted, and modified," were neither unconditional nor unidirectional. 44 There are several reasons why this issue zeroes in on the "high point" of this era, from the 1950s to the late 1970s. 45 First, the three decades spanned the full spectrum of the conflict's dynamic, from escalation in the early 1950s to détente in the early 1970s and back to the so-called Second Cold War following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Two crises on both sides of the Atlantic, Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962), punctuated the mounting military and diplomatic tensions. Their tidal waves were accompanied by a roller coaster of nuclear fears and, since the late 1950s, antinuclear protests that strained the Euro-American partnership and produced catastrophic fictions of the kind examined by Gerrit Roessler. Second, during this period, the transatlantic exchanges reached their utmost intensity. They were predicated on "the Cold War domestic consensus on both sides of the Atlantic about anti-communism, containment, and isolation of the Soviet Union but also [on] Keynesianism and social policies," Western Europe's "willingness to be a junior partner," as well as "widespread Western European sympathy and admiration for America's political values, global presence, and popular culture." 46 Third, precisely over these years the U.S. established its hegemony over global broadcasting and thus, as many Americans believed, paved the way toward winning the Cold War. 47 Fourth, the dawn of this period marked a "resurgence of critical thinking about broadcasting." 48 In particular, the German-Jewish exiles emerged as the foremost traffickers in transatlantic mass media diagnoses and forecasts. Adorno, Horkheimer, or Siegfried Kracauer not only moonlighted as freelance employees of several American initiatives investigating radio's role, including Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Research, the Hacker Foundation, or the High Commission for Occupied Germany (HICOG). 49 Following the remigration of the former two, their influential vitriolic observations about the mass media in the western hemisphere were poised to tinge the burgeoning perceptions of the Cold War-era audiovisual landscape in West Germany. The sonic medium, the duo wrote, "democratically makes everyone equally into listeners, in order to expose them in authoritarian fashion to the same programs put out by different stations." 50 Despite having been sketched "on the basis of social phenomena of the 1930s and 1940s in America," the resulting image of the synthetic, amorphous, homogenous, and mass-produced "dreamless art" claimed universality. 51 The latter, following the text's German edition in 1969, glossed over significant differences between the styles, contents, and purposes of German and American broadcasting. These are some the differences that this collection of articles aspires to put back into the picture. Anything but a bolt in the "culture industry" apparatus, West German radio, to Maxl's disgruntlement, called upon "Göte and Schiller" to conjure up the ghost of a very different culture-that of the blurred Kulturnation. The medium's "cultural mission," or Kulturauftrag, formally decreed by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1961 and defended to this day, gained momentum in the Cold War.
52
The Contributions: Culture, Territory, and Memory of the Cold War
From this vantage point, it is hardly surprising that culture, nemesis of Maxl's leisure, looms large in contributions to this issue. Benno Nietzel considers the tense relationship between entertainment and culture in the intellectual discourse on broadcasting during the 1950s. The uneasy coexistence of radio's task to educate and refine its audience, the function of entertainment in its programs, and the difficult-to-bridle public use of the medium, the author argues, spurred extensive discussions of its programming at the same time as it invited attempts to institute and control normative listener behaviors. Adopting the viewpoint of programming, Monika Boll interrogates cultural radio as the so-called linkes Refugium-one of the few oases of leftism on the overwhelmingly conservative landscape of public mass media in the Adenauer era. Fundamental to West Germany's postwar selfdefinition, its productions and choice of speakers, the author proposes, championed West German sociology as a viable alternative to East German socialism. Anna Parkinson's essay focuses on one of this radio's frequent voices-Theodor W. Adorno's-to investigate the central role of affect in relationship to pedagogy in his broadcasts of the early 1960s. As she analyzes the tension between a Freudian model of affect and a Kantian model of moral autonomy or enlightenment in the famous address "What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean" and several lesser-known radio texts, Parkinson joins Boll in reflecting on the role of radio as constitutive of the country's public sphere at the time.
Culture, as its cooptation into the nineteenth-century term Kulturnationan entity larger than what the territorial boundaries circumscribe-suggests, has had a profoundly unstable relationship to territory. Following 1945, Germany's territory itself was similarly uncertain. Precisely this uncertainty defined West German radio's position vis-à-vis the country's contested borders in East and West alike. In this regard, the 1950s registered as the moment when broadcasting policies as much as specific shows reiterated and re-defined the famous dictum from Goethe and Schiller's Xenien: "Germany-but where is it?" Inge Marszolek considers West Germany's relationship to the indistinct eastern contours of the Kulturnation to interrogate the complicity of German radio in the longstanding tradition of "cartographic claims" with regard to Eastern Europe. 53 The author examines how a show aired on Radio Bremen in 1953 mobilized the listeners' imagination and radio's visual thrust (the genre known as Hörbild) to recuperate, on the airwaves, the "lost" German territories in the East. The recourse to the heterotopic German Heimat on a medium well known for its ability to violate borders was, Marszolek asserts, a conscious attempt to negate the legitimacy of the Oder-Neisse line, recognized by West Germany only (partially) in 1970. If radio's "special license for the state of dreaming" generally nurtures phantoms and imaginings, on Radio Bremen, it follows, these took on unexpectedly concrete physical contours traceable on a map. 54 Alexander Badenoch, conversely, steps back to take a look at Germany from the European exterior and examine how the changing continental environment shaped the broadcasting space of the divided nation. On the airwaves, he argues, Germany was constituted by several "border regimes," tantamount to the ability of broadcasting to stake out or challenge borders as conventional markers of political sovereignty. And yet such a constitution, he adds, has always been a two-way process. It has included both the extrinsic designs for the nation's broadcasting space as much as (West) Germany's own interventions, among which the author singles out those at the western border in particular.
A portentous soundtrack to the key screened vignettes of twentieth-century German history-the short-lived porosity between East and West Berlin of the late 1950s in Gerhard Klein's A Berlin Romance (1956), Germany's first postwar World Soccer Cup victory in the World Soccer Cup in Rainer Werner Fassbinder's The Marriage of Maria Braun (1978) , or the gradual erosion of small-town insularity in Edgar Reitz' Heimat (1984)-West German radio connected not only various kinds of spaces and places. It also conjoined various kinds of media in acts of "cross-pollination."
55 Gerrit Roessler's contribution tackles radio's ability to invoke multiple technologies, in this case those recruited to preserve the memory of the era's worst scenario-nuclear destruction. While American productions-films such as The World, the Flesh and the Devil (1959), Panic in the Year Zero (1962), or the much later TV drama The Day After (1983)-envisioned radio as the only functional means of communication in the wake of the Armageddon, the West German science fiction radio play introduced by Roessler complicates such a pragmatic design. Instead of a means of self-situating in a postnuclear world, radio becomes a second-degree storage device for the memory of the catastrophe that, as far as the listener is concerned, never took place. The author examines how the play's broadcast evokes such memory. At the same time, he raises the question of longevity with respect to both broadcasting media and their physical (storage) mediums.
Not surprisingly, radio's own longevity-both as a means of communication and a piece of technology-has been under continuous scrutiny ever since the late 1950s. At that point, it "did not disappear or fade away" but "changed … to a local, music-dominated, more diverse and fragmented industry." 56 It became a "'Begleitmedium', a medium accompanying listeners while they were busy with other activities." 57 Yet, in the twenty-first century, when iPods and Digital Audio Broadcast are traditional radio's omnipresent competitors, being local or music-dominated is no longer sufficient. 58 To whom does radio reach out? How democratic is it? How much culture does it need? What constitutes culture? Does the medium breed individualism or, conversely, summon communities? 59 It is small wonder that these very current questions echo Maxl's now sixty-year-old deliberations and thus direct us to the past decades in search of answers. Seemingly new, today's digital turn in sound broadcasting reiterates many of the challenges articulated already at the end of German radio's golden age, around the late 1950s and early 1960s. It is then hardly surprising that radio's present-day survival, some suggest, may hinge on practicing the critical look backward. "Radio's future," as Helmut Lehnert, one of Germany's most prominent radio innovators of today, has once remarked, "lies in its past." 60 If that is the case, the rapidly accelerating transatlantic momentum of the Cold War's first three decades may prove to be a proper vanishing point for such a retrospective glance. 
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